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Introduction
Mistaken eyewitness identification is the single largest source of wrongful
convictions in documented exoneration cases.1 To combat the risk of wrongful
conviction, defendants in New York have begun to request that an expert on eyewitness
identification be permitted to testify. However, this is unnecessary because a significant
number of wrongful convictions based on mistaken eyewitness identifications could be
prevented by proper investigative procedures and more effective trial representation.2
This paper will illustrate how the problem of wrongful convictions based on
mistaken identifications in New York can be overcome by altering the investigative
procedures implemented by police departments and making better use of effective trial
techniques presently made available to defendants rather than by allowing expert
eyewitness identification testimony at trial. Part I discusses the research that has been
done concerning factors that an expert eyewitness identification witness might testify
about at trial. Part II discusses the New York test that expert testimony must meet in
order to be admitted at trial. Part III lists negative affects of expert eyewitness testimony.
Part IV summarizes what New York courts have said on the issue of expert eyewitness
identification testimony. Part V considers the alternatives to expert eyewitness
identification. Part VI concludes by suggesting that the problem of mistaken
identifications could be overcome by altering the investigative procedures and employing

1

Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231 (2000).
2
GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK, ix, The Carswell Co. Ltd., (1988).
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effective trial techniques rather than allowing expert eyewitness identification testimony
at trial.
Part I: Topics for Expert Eyewitness Testimony
The substance of an expert witness’s testimony concerning eyewitness
identification differs depending on the specific case, but there are certain factors that are
common to most cases that involve such testimony. These factors include the race of the
witness and defendant, the use of violence in the criminal incident, a confidence-accuracy
correlation, and weapon focus.3

A. Cross-Racial Identifications
If the case involves an eyewitness who identified someone of a different race, an
expert may testify as to the fallibility of cross-racial identifications. Research shows that
people have difficulty recognizing individual members of a race different from one’s
own.4 Many explanations for the cross-racial effect have been offered, but none have
been conclusively accepted.5 One seemingly accurate explanation is that we use specific
features to distinguish between members of our own race, and those features do not assist
us when distinguishing between members of another race.6 Another explanation that has
been advanced is that we are more able to distinguish between members of a different
race when we spend a significant amount of time with people of that race. One study

3

People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 at 202 (New York County 2002).
Scott Woller, Rethinking the Role of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification in New York, 48 N.Y.L.SCH.L.REV. 323, (2004).
5
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, 86-88, Lexis Law Publishing
(1997).
6
Deborah Davis et al., Foibles of Witness Memory for Traumatic/High Profile Events, 66 J. AIR. L. & COM.
1421, at 1443 citing D. Dunning et al., Basketball Fandom and Cross-Race Identification Among
European-Americans: Another Look at the Contact Hypothesis, presented at the American PsychologyLaw Society (Mar. 1998).
4
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reinforcing this explanation shows that Caucasians who are avid basketball fans have less
difficulty with cross-racial identification because of their repeated exposure to AfricanAmerican faces.7 This can be likened to analogous studies done on individuals who have
repeated exposure to different models and years of cars.8 In these studies, the witnesses
who have learned to distinguish the different models and years of most cars can name and
describe any particular type of a car quite accurately.9 If this explanation is accepted and
taken one step further a prosecutor whose witness’s identification is questioned due to its
cross-racial nature could show evidence that the witness had repeated exposure to people
of the same race as the defendant, and possibility overcome the supposed fallibility of the
witness’s cross-racial identification.

B. Violence/Weapon Focus
Studies conducted within classroom environments show that a witness who
observed a violent event may be unable to recall the event accurately.10 Yet, victims in
real life situations involving violence, such as the Holocaust, wars, kidnapping or sexual
abuse have memories from these traumatic incidents that are more likely to persist over
time, and the victim is often unable to forget the incident.11 Likewise, studies have

7

Deborah Davis et al., Foibles of Witness Memory for Traumatic/High Profile Events, 66 J. AIR. L. & COM.
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shown that memories from actual incidents, where the threat and trauma are real, actually
demonstrate a highly accurate, detailed and persistent account of the incident.12
Some psychologists claim that witnesses frequently focus on a weapon and this
reduces their memory of other details of the crime.13 Yet, studies show that there is no
difference in accuracy, irrespective of the presence or absence of a weapon.14 Further,
“…eyewitnesses in crimes involving a weapon provided more detailed descriptions than
those in weaponless crimes and victims offered more detailed descriptions than
witnesses.”15

C. Confidence-Accuracy Correlation
Many proponents of expert eyewitness testimony posit that a witness’s confidence
in their identification is not an indicator of their accuracy, and since jurors are reminded
that they are to judge the witness’s credibility and reliability, perhaps they should be
made aware that an eyewitness’s confidence in their identification is not necessarily
linked to the accuracy of their identification.16 However, a recent study conducted by
Drs. Venter and Louw found that there is a positive correlation between confidence and
accuracy.17 Also, according to Dr. Ebbe B. Ebbesen, a recognized expert in the field, the
determination of whether the correlation between accuracy and confidence is positive or

12

A. Venter et al., The Effect of Violent Versus Non-Violent Incidents on Eyewitness Memory, 23 MED. & L.
833 at 834, 849 (2004).
13
Scott Woller, Rethinking the Role of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification in New York, 48 N.Y.L.SCH.L.REV. 323 at 341, (2004).
14
People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 at 197 (New York County 2002).
15
Id.
16
Heather Sonnenberg, The Admissibility of Expert Identification Testimony in New York Courts According
to People v. Lee, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 231 at 241 (2002).
17
A Venter, The Effect of Confidence and Method of Questioning on Eyewitness Testimony, 24 MED. & L.
369 at 381 (2005).
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negative varies widely over studies.18 This means that it cannot be definitively stated that
a witness’s confidence indicates either a correct identification or an incorrect
identification. Additionally, Dr. Ebbesen notes that there are certain factors that affect
accuracy, such as length of exposure and retention interval.19 Little research has
examined what the relationship between confidence and accuracy might be when these
other factors are considered.20 As a result, it is generally accepted within the relevant
community that there is no specific correlation between confidence and accuracy.

D. Field Studies
“Experimental results ‘cannot be generalized to real cases due to a lack of realism
of experiment procedures.”’21 To date, memory research has mostly been conducted in
the laboratory.22 Since many of the studies previously conducted concerning eyewitness
identification are done in a controlled environment, all of the possible variables are
already known.23 This is unlike an actual criminal incident where the variables are
unknown and the degree to which these variables interact is also unknown.24 For this
reason, psychologists are unable to definitively predict the effect of certain variables on
an eyewitness in an actual criminal incident versus a staged criminal incident.25 It should
also be noted that the majority of studies concerning eyewitness accuracy take place in a
18

Ebbe B. Ebbesen, A Signal Detection Analysis of the Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy in
Face Recognition Memory: Implications for Eyewitness Identifications, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, p. 1 (working
draft).
19
Retention interval refers to the amount of time between observing the criminal and being asked to
identify him. Ebbe B. Ebbesen, A Signal Detection Analysis of the Relationship Between Confidence and
Accuracy in Face Recognition Memory: Implications for Eyewitness Identifications, p. 1 (working draft).
20
People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 at 197 (New York County 2002).
21
Id. at 199 quoting Dr. Ebbesen, an expert who testified in the trial.
22
A. Venter et al., Memory Accuracy of a Real-Life Simulated Incident, 23 MED. & L 403 at 404 (2004).
23
People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 at 202 (New York County 2002)
24
Id.
25
Id.
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classroom using middle class students from suburban areas, thus it is difficult to say how
people growing up in a tough inner city may react to other races, weapons, and
violence.26 A crime victim will be focused on the crime being committed against them,
while a student in a classroom may be daydreaming, or even sleeping while the staged
crime is taking place.27 As stated by Dr. Louw et. al., “To make an impact in the area of
eyewitness testimony in coming up with results which are less affected by confounding
variables, it would…be important for researchers in this field to reconstruct events which
have the qualities of real-life incidents...”.28

Part II. Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence
Before novel scientific evidence can be admitted through the testimony of an
expert, the methods and principles underlying the evidence must be generally accepted
within the relevant discipline.29 In 1994, the New York Court of Appeals case of People
v. Wesley held that the Frye test was the proper standard for the admissibility of expert
scientific evidence.30 In Frye v. United States the court held that a systolic blood
pressure deception test had not “yet gained such standing and scientific recognition
among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in
admitting expert testimony adduced from the discovery, development, and experiment
thus far made.”31 This holding developed into the four-fold Frye test.32 Under this test,
an expert must be competent to testify about the subject matter; the testimony must
26

Joseph N. Sorrentino, Defanging the Defense Eyewitness Expert, 28 –AUG PROSECUTOR 22 at 24 (1994).
Id.
28
A. Venter et al., Memory Accuracy of a Real-Life Simulated Incident, 23 MED. & L 403 at 423 (2004).
29
John S. DeWitt, Novel Scientific Evidence and Controversial Cases: A Social Psychological Examination,
21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1997).
30
People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y. 2d 417 (1994).
31
Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, Court of Appeals of District of Columbia (1923).
32
People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 (New York County 2002).
27
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conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory; the testimony must be beyond the
ken of the jury; and the probative value of the testimony must outweigh its prejudicial
effect.33 Usually if a judge does not allow expert eyewitness testimony it is because the
testimony fails on the second, third or fourth prong.

A. General Acceptance
The second prong: that the testimony must conform to a generally accepted
explanatory theory, means that the particular procedure need not be unanimously
accepted by the relevant community but must be generally acceptable as reliable.34 Not
all expert eyewitness testimony is generally accepted by the social psychological
community.35 As detailed above, there is much controversy surrounding the areas of
cross-racial identification, violence, weapon focus and the confidence-accuracy
correlation. In addition, the New York Court of Appeals has held that it is within the trial
judge’s discretion whether to admit this testimony.36 One reason provided for this
holding is, “in recognition that expert testimony of this nature may involve novel
scientific theories and techniques, a trial court may need to determine whether the
proffered expert testimony is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.”37

33

People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 (New York County 2002).
People v. Middleton 54 N.Y.2d 42 (1981)
35
People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 (New York County 2002).
36
People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 at 162 (2001).
37
People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 at 162 (2001) citing People v. Wesley 83 N.Y.2d 417 (1994).
34

9

B. Ken of Jury
The trial court must determine whether the evidence to be offered is within the
ken of the average juror, or if it will assist the jurors in reaching a verdict.38 Generally,
jurors use all of the evidence presented to them to determine whether the eyew
itness’s
identification is reliable. Thus, it is likely that the average juror already takes into
consideration the confidence-accuracy correlation, the effect of race on an identification,
and the presence of a weapon when determining the accuracy of the witness’s
identification.39 Thus, offering expert testimony concerning these topics seems to invade
the province of the jury as it presents them with information that is either already known
to them, or has already been considered by them.

C. Probative v. Prejudicial Effect
The idea that eyewitness expert testimony may prejudice jurors against the
eyewitness rather than compel them to carefully apply new knowledge in their own
evaluation of the eyewitness may be the strongest objection to such testimony.40 Studies
have shown that testimony from an expert about research on eyewitness reliability
generated reductions in jurors’ beliefs about the accuracy of the eyewitness.41
Alternatively, defendants should be wary of presenting expert testimony because
undoubtedly the prosecution will respond with an expert of their own and studies show

38

People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 at 162 (2001).
Joseph N. Sorrentino, Defanging the Defense Eyewitness Expert, 28 –AUG PROSECUTOR 22 at 24 (1994)
40
Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 909 at 921 (1995).
41
Neil Vidmar et al., Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1121 (2001) citing Harmon N.
Hosch, A Comparison of Three Studies of the Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors, 4 LAW & HUMAN
BEHAV. 297 (1980).
39
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that biased jurors may be motivated to use less valid scientific testimony (which could
come from either expert) to bolster their own previously held notions.42

Part III. Negative Affects of Expert Eyewitness Testimony
Expert eyewitness testimony can negatively affect the jury and the court. This
testimony may cause jurors to become confused43 in that several experts may testify in a
given trial and each expert may present a different study with a different outcome, which
results from the lack of a general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.
Along the same line, allowing this testimony to be presented at trial will result in a “battle
of the experts.” This will result in longer trials on dockets that are already behind
schedule. A further negative affect of expert eyewitness testimony is that it invades the
essential reliability assessing function of the jury.44

Part IV. New York Courts and Expert Eyewitness Testimony
The New York Court of Appeals has considered the admissibility of expert
eyewitness testimony in two cases: People v. Mooney and People v. Lee.45 In People v.
Mooney, in 1990, the majority affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the
defendant’s motion for an expert identification witness in a hasty two paragraph opinion,
and Judge Kaye wrote a lengthy dissent.46 In 2001, when the Court of Appeals revisited
the topic in People v. Lee, Judge Kaye was Chief Judge and concurred in the majority
42

John S. Dewitt, Novel Scientific Evidence and Controversial Cases: A Social Psychological Examination,
21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 at 22 (1997).
43
Edward Stein, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness
Identification, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 295 at 298 (2003).
44
United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 at 1106 (7th Cir. 1998), United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280 at
289 (2nd Cir. 1999), United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996).
45
People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827 (1990), People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 (2001).
46
People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827 (1990).
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opinion which held that expert testimony is not inadmissible per se, and that the decision
whether to admit it rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.47 The Court of Appeals
also went on to say that a trial court should only admit expert eyewitness identification
testimony when jurors are unable “…to draw conclusions from the evidence based on
their day-to-day experience, their common observation and their knowledge, and when
they would be benefited by the specialized knowledge of an expert witness.”48 The trial
courts of New York have since grappled with the issue of whether to admit expert
eyewitness testimony.
In both People v. Lopez and People v. Miller, the Appellate Division of the First
Department held that the lower courts did not abuse their discretion in denying the
defendant’s motion to present expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification.49
Further, the court held that even without the expert testimony the defendant was able to
attack the eyewitness testimony through cross-examination and summation arguments.50
In People v. Paccione, the Appellate Division of the Second Department held that
the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to call an
expert witness on the matter of eyewitness identification because he failed to make a
showing that his case was one where the jurors would have benefited from the specialized
knowledge of an expert witness.51
In People v. Johnson, the Appellate Division of the Fourth Department held that
the lower court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the proposed expert
eyewitness identification testimony was not beyond the ken of the ordinary juror and was
47

People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 at 160 (2001).
People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157 at 162 (2001).
49
People v. Lopez, 1 A.D.3d 168 (1st Dep’t 2003), People v. Miller 8 A.D.3d 176 (1st Dep’t 2004).
50
People v. Lopez, 1 A.D.3d 168 (1st Dep’t 2003), People v. Miller 8 A.D.3d 176 (1st Dep’t 2004).
51
People v. Paccione, 295 A.D.2d 451 (2nd Dep’t 2002).
48
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therefore inadmissible.52 The New York Court of Appeals later denied leave to appeal.53
Similarly, in People v. Young, the Fourth Department again held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to permit expert testimony on
the subject of eyewitness identification.54
In People v. Carrieri, the defendant sought to have an expert witness testify with
regard to the accuracy of cross-racial identification.55 The court determined that,
“unsettled debate over the relationship between ‘own-race’ bias and cross-racial
identification would render such expert testimony inadmissible until there is a general
agreement about its effects in the scientific community.”56 The court stated further that,
“…jurors are generally aware of the vagaries involved in witness identification through
their own life experiences.”57 The court also pointed out that the Supreme Court urged in
Wade that it is common knowledge that identification testimony generally is suspect
because witnesses may make mistakes or forget what they have seen.58 Finally, the court
held that the testimony was inadmissible “…on the grounds that it falls within the ambit
of jurors’ general knowledge and life experience as well as due to its questionable
scientific validity.”59
In People v. Radcliffe, the court stated that expert identification testimony should
present specialized knowledge about identification that would help the finder of fact
determine the accuracy of the identification.60 Interestingly, this court noted that the

52

People v. Johnson, 303 A.D.2d 967 (4th Dep’t 2003).
People v. Johnson, 100 N.Y.2d 583 (2003).
54
People v. Young, 20 A.D.3d 893 (4th Dep’t 2005).
55
People v. Carrieri, 4 Misc.3d 307 (Queens County 2004).
56
Id. at 308.
57
Id. at. 309.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
People v. Radcliffe, 191 Misc.2d 545 (Bronx County 2002).
53
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Court of Appeals decision in Lee suggested that if a contested identification is
corroborated by other evidence, there may be no need for expert testimony.61 The
defendant requested expert eyewitness identification testimony concerning exposure
time.62 The court responded to this request by stating that this testimony would not be
beyond the ken of the typical juror.63 Finally, the court held that the defendant’s pretrial
application for permission to call an expert on identification would not be denied but held
in abeyance until a more clear and precise application was put forth by the defendant.64
In People v. Santiago, the court determined that expert identification testimony
was not appropriate.65 However, the court did instruct the jury that certainty and
accuracy are different concepts, and that one does not guarantee the other.66 In this way,
the court conveyed to the jury a concept that an expert might have testified about. The
court also stated that the parties may suggest ways to address, during jury selection and in
the final instructions, the topic of a witness’s confidence.67
In People v. Smith, the court held that expert eyewitness identification testimony
was permissible,68 but never provided the rationale for allowing this testimony.69 This
makes it difficult to cite this case as propounding any specific rule of law.70
In People v. Legrand, the defendant sought to introduce expert identification
testimony regarding the confidence-accuracy correlation, post-event information and

61

Id. at 547.
People v. Radcliffe, 191 Misc.2d 545 at 549 (Bronx County 2002).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 552.
65
People v. Santiago, 2 Misc.3d 652 (New York County 2003).
66
Id. at 653.
67
Id. at 653.
68
People v. Smith, 191 Misc.2d 765 (New York County 2002).
69
Id.
70
Id.
62

14

confidence malleability, and weapon focus.71 The court first found that the search for a
general consensus on confidence-accuracy isundermined by the lack of an accepted
standard of measurement among psychologists.72 The court went on to conclude that the
confidence-accuracy correlation has not yet achieved general acceptability within the
relevant scientific community and thus it could not be admitted.73 The court also held
that the proposed testimony on post event information and confidence malleability has
not been generally accepted.74 In regard to weapon focus, the court found that there have
been experiments that have demonstrated that the presence of a weapon did not hinder the
ability of eyewitnesses to offer a detailed description. In addition, victims of crime that
involved a weapon provided more detailed descriptions than those in weaponless
crimes.75 Thus, the court held that the testimony on weapon focus could not be admitted
because it was not generally accepted.76 The court also discussed laboratory versus
reality, and considered whether it is generally accepted for experts to apply what they
have learned from laboratory studies to the testimonies of actual eyewitnesses in real life
criminal events.77 The court in dicta stated, “…Dr. Ebbesen and Dr. Malpass have both
agreed that the experts do not exactly understand why various research results have been
reached. This is not a debate among experts about a generally accepted principle.
Rather, it is a real controversy among the relevant experts concerning whether these
principles are generally accepted.”78

71

People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 (New York County 2002).
Id.
73
People v. Legrand, 196 Misc.2d 179 at 192 (New York County 2002).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 209.
72
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In 2004 in the case of People v. Champagne Smith, the court denied the
defendant’s request for expert testimony concerning eyewitness testimony and
identification.79 The request was denied because the proffered expert testimony
(concerning the confidence-accuracy correlation, confidence malleability and post event
information, unconscious transference, and weapon focus) was not generally accepted
within the relevant field.80
The court of People v. Trinidad is yet another court that considered whether to
allow expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification, and denied the defendant’s
request.81 The court decided that the defendant had failed to demonstrate what
contribution a scientific study of perception and memory could add “…to the common
experience of the average person or juror who witnesses all the time and could apply
commonsense analysis to the evaluation of the eyewitnesses’ testimony.”82

Part IV. Alternatives To Expert Eyewitness Testimony
There are several alternatives to permitting experts to testify concerning
eyewitness identification. These alternatives can be implemented both at the
investigative stage and at the trial stage.

79

People v. Smith, 2004 Slip Op 50172U (New York County 2004).
People v. Smith, 2004 Slip Op 50172U (New York County 2004).
81
People v. Trinidad, 188 Misc.2d 324 (Kings County 2001).
82
People v. Trinidad, 188 Misc.2d 324 (Kings County 2001).
80
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A. Investigative Stage

1. Crime Scene
When police officers first arrive at a crime scene they should obtain descriptions
from all potential eyewitnesses.83 The police should immediately separate these
witnesses so that they are not swayed by each others’ descriptions.84 By receiving
numerous descriptions, the police officers will be able to determine which witnesses’
descriptions are the most reliable and which witnesses may have had a poor vantage point
while observing the incident.85 It is best to obtain descriptions as soon as possible.86
This is because memory retrieval success declines with the passage of time.87 The
witnesses should be asked open ended questions rather than leading questions.88 Finally,
police officers should document information obtained from a witness, while being careful
not to paraphrase what the witness said, as this may lead to problems later.89

2. Mug Books and Composites
The next step in the identification process is preparing mug books and/or
composites.90 Usually, an eyewitness is shown a large number of mug shots to ensure
that the perpetrator’s picture will be among those viewed if it is within the possession of

83

GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK,

84

Id.

85

GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK,

28, The Carswell Co. Ltd., (1988).

28, The Carswell Co. Ltd., (1988).
Id. at 31.
87
Id.
88
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, (Dep’t Justice October 1999) at 15.
89
Id. at 39.
90
Id. at 17.
86
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the police department.91 Showing a large number of mug shots decreases the likelihood
of an accurate identification.92 Dr. Gary L. Wells, a known expert in the field of
eyewitness identification, suggests “pruning” the mug book periodically to eliminate
photos of people who could not have committed any recent crime.93 This would be
accomplished by removing people who are presently incarcerated, or are deceased.94
Mug shot photos should be grouped by format to ensure that no photo unduly stands out,
and the photos should be uniform with regard to general physical characteristics.95 It is
also important to be sure that only one photo of each individual is in the mug book.96
The witness should be advised that the person who committed the crime may not be in
the mug book.97 When or if, the witness chooses a picture, the police officer should
document the procedure and the outcome.98 Composite images may be useful, but they
should be reserved for special cases where the police officers are reasonably sure that the
eyewitness can perform well at the task.99

3. Photo Arrays and Line-ups
In the investigative stage police departments often utilize photo-arrays (or photo
line-ups). A photo-array should be used only when there is a definite suspect or suspects

91

GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK,

52, The Carswell Co. Ltd., (1988
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, (Dep’t Justice October 1999) at 17.
96
Id..
97
Id.
98
Id. at 20.
99
GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK, 42, The Carswell Co. Ltd., (1988).
92
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and when a live line-up cannot be performed.100 Only one suspect should be included in
each photo-array and five fillers (foils or distractors) should be included.101 The fillers
should generally fit the witness’s description of the perpetrator, but the fillers should not
so closely resemble the suspect that a person familiar with the suspect might find it
difficult to distinguish the suspect from the fillers.102 The fillers in a line-up should all be
wearing clothing that is similar to that of the suspect.103 Generally, the picture of the
suspect, or the suspect himself (in the case of a live line-up) should not be placed in the
middle of the line-up.104 When showing a new suspect to the same witness, officers
should refrain from reusing fillers.105 The witness should be instructed that the
perpetrator may not be in the photo-array.106 Police officers should follow these same
guidelines when composing live line-ups.107 It should also be noted that “experiments
have generally failed to demonstrate superior performance by an eyewitnesses when they
identify from a live line-up versus a color photo-array.”108

100

Live lineups cannot be performed when there is a lack of people available that resemble the suspect, or
when the suspect has not yet been found. GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM
HANDBOOK, 57, The Carswell Co. Ltd., (1988).
101
GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK, 28, The Carswell Co. Ltd., (1988),
interview with Police Officer Herbert, New York Police Department, Queens County, Precinct 104
(October 30, 2005).
102
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement at p. 29.
103
“If the suspect is wearing a hat, we will all wear hats”, Interview with Police Officer Herbert, New York
Police Department, Queens County, Precinct 104 (October 30, 2005).
104
Interview with Police Officer Herbert, New York Police Department, Queens County, Precinct 104
(October 30, 2005).
105
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, (Dep’t Justice October 1999) at 30.
106
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, (Dep’t Justice October 1999) at 32., GARY L.
WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A SYSTEM HANDBOOK, 74, The Carswell Co. Ltd., (1988).
107
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4. Double Blind Line-ups
When conducting photo arrays or live line-ups, a double blind method should be
employed.109 A double blind method is implemented by having an officer who is not
involved in the case conduct the photo array or line-up.110 This method should be utilized
because officers that are involved in the case often show a bias to the witness through
inadvertent or sometimes advertent behavior.111
Several New York courts have considered whether to require the use of a double
blind method.112 Four lower courts in New York have concluded that it would violate the
separation of powers to direct law enforcement how to conduct a line-up.113 Three lower
courts in New York have granted defendant’s motion for a double blind line-up,114 while
two lower courts in New York have denied the defendant’s motion because the research
did not conclusively show superiority of double blind line-ups when compared to regular
line-ups.115 Overall, the majority of New York courts that have considered the issue have
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either held or made recommendations that New York State’s district attorneys’ offices
and police departments begin employing the double blind method.116
Although not all of the methods explained above would be feasible in every
situation, every jurisdiction should consider them to avoid mistaken identifications.

B. Trial Stage
At trial there are several ways to reduce or eliminate the potential for a wrongful
conviction based on a mistaken identification.117 There are a number of safeguards
already built into the system to protect the rights of the defendant and allow her to
challenge the veracity or accuracy of identifications.118 Defense counsel should attempt
to use pretrial hearings, voir dire, cross-examination, opening and closing statements, and
jury instructions to overcome the possibility of a conviction based on a mistaken
identification.119
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1. Motion to Suppress
Defense counsel should always make a motion to suppress the identification
testimony.120 Identification testimony can be suppressed if the identification is the result
of an illegal seizure of the defendant, if the identification violated the defendant’s right to
counsel, or if it was obtained under circumstances that are so unduly suggestive as to give
rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.121

2. Voir Dire
The next point at which a defense attorney may alert the jury or judge to the
possibility of a mistaken identification is at voir dire.122 Usually a lawyer choosing a jury
panel is attempting not only to elicit sufficient information to exercise peremptory
challenges intelligently, but also to convey something of his or her theory of the case to
the jurors.123 Generally, counsel should attempt to discover at this point whether the
potential jurors believe that a witness could honestly be mistaken about an identification,
or that a witness could be confident about their identification without being accurate as to
that identification.124 Counsel should also look for experiences that may cause the jury to
relate to the eyewitness, or experiences that may cause the jury to have doubts about the
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eyewitness’s testimony.125 If a juror is able to relate to a witness they will be more likely
to evaluate the witness’s reliability and credibility favorably.

3. Opening Statement and Closing Argument
Other points at which defense counsel can alert the judge or judge to the
possibility of mistaken identification are the opening statement and closing argument.
Since the majority of trial attorneys use opening statements and closing arguments to
familiarize the jury or judge with the legal and factual theories of their case, and to dilute
the impact of their opponent’s strong points and their own weak points, there is no reason
why defense counsel could not use his opening statement and closing argument to alert
the jury or judge to the unreliable nature of eyewitness identification (but counsel must be
careful to comment only on evidence brought out during the trial).126

4. Cross-Examination
Defense counsel will have the opportunity to cross-examine the eyewitness. For
cross-examination to be effective in this context defense counsel must ask questions to
highlight the potential for error in the identification process.127 These include
suggestiveness of the police-orchestrated identification procedure, the stress levels of the
eyewitness, the lighting conditions, the duration of the incident, the race of the defendant
(if different from that of the witness), and, if there was a weapon involved, counsel may
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focus his questioning on whether the eyewitness was looking at the weapon or the
perpetrator’s face.128

5. Jury Instructions
Lastly, defense counsel should request a jury instruction concerning the
eyewitness testimony.129 Since the power of jury instructions is well-recognized in the
judicial system, defense counsel should request that the judge instruct the jury concerning
the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, and defense counsel should provide special
instructions tailored to their case.130 These instructions could include factors such as
whether the witness had an adequate opportunity for observation, the strength and
circumstances of the witness’s recollection of the incident, the amount of time between
incident and identification, and any occasions where the witness failed to identify or
misidentified the defendant.131

Part VI. Conclusion
Attorneys, judges, police officers and legislators agree that the repeated
convictions of innocent individuals is something that continues to plague the entire New
York State criminal justice system. No end is served by convicting an innocent person.
However, this problem is one that can and should be overcome by more effective use of
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tried and proven tactics and techniques, and not by presenting controversial psychological
research, experiments, and results to the juries of New York State.
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